© picture alliance / NurPhoto | Nicolas Economou
© picture alliance / NurPhoto | Nicolas Economou
Yaşar Aydın and Marcela Müggler
Special thanks to Daniel Kettner, Anton Delchmann, Michael Westrich and Sören Brauckmann
November 2026
Germany and Turkey have strong economic ties, including in trade, investment, and tourism. Companies from each country have a significant presence in sectors such as manufacturing, textiles, and automobiles. Against this backdrop, we argue that owing to growing trade and investment levels, bilateral political and economic cooperation has considerable upward potential.
Germany and Turkey have a long-standing and multi-faceted relationship in the economic, political, security, and cultural spheres, while Germany is an indispensable partner for Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). These bilateral relations have a strong transnational dimension, namely, a large (labour) migrant community in Germany and significant mobility between the two countries – for example, through tourism and the exchange of expatriates. But it is the respective economies – and trade in particular – that form the main pillar of the bilateral relationship, which has survived and overcome frequent diplomatic tensions and interstate differences on geopolitical issues.
Since the 19th century, Germany and Turkey have not only engaged in commerce but also collaborated politically and militarily (see the Chronology below).
This is an update of the first version of the visualisation, published in October 2024 by Yaşar Aydın, Jens Bastian, and Maximiliane Schneider. It incorporates new data and developments up to November 2026, reflecting recent changes in bilateral economic relations. Further, its scope is broadened by German-Turkish economic relations being examined within the wider framework of EU-Turkish relations. New and expanded visuals highlight the role of the EU as Turkey's largest trading partner, the importance of the Customs Union (CU), and investment and trade relations between Turkey and the EU.
This visual platform consists of maps, charts, and short explanatory texts. An overview of economic relations between Germany and Turkey is provided while the political and institutional framework as well as demographic and socio-cultural dimensions are included. The aim is not only to highlight the extent of, and prospects for, cooperation but also to demonstrate where and why the potential in the bilateral relationship is being under-utilised. Empirically, the analysis is based mainly on primary data sources, which are listed below each of the figures. In addition, the various topics discussed draw on a growing body of academic and other literature.
First, the political and institutional framework of bilateral economic relations between Germany and Turkey is outlined. Second, the two countries are compared on key economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth, and population and demographic projections. Third, we describe the main features of the Turkish and German economies, as these serve as important guidelines for Turkish and German companies faced with investment decisions. Fourth, the sectoral characteristics of the Turkish economy are examined, including changes in data on Turkish defence exports. The fifth section takes a brief look at the Turkish defence industry, and the sixth and seventh sections explore Turkey’s trade with German and the EU and transnational relations, respectively.
Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1924 | German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship |
| 1927 | German-Turkish trade agreement |
| 1961 | Agreement on the recruitment of Turkish workers for the German labour market (Anwerbeabkommen) |
| 1963 | Ankara Agreement (Association Agreement between European Economic Community and Turkey) |
| 1970 | Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement |
| 1996 | EU-Turkey Customs Union (Association Council Decision No. 1/95) |
| 1999 | Candidate status for Turkey granted at the EU summit in Helsinki |
| 2005 | EU accession talks with Turkey |
| 2012 | German-Turkish Energy Forum |
| 2013 | German-Turkish Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) |
| 2016 | EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement |
| 2021 | Ratification by Turkey of the Paris Climate Agreement |
| 2024 | EU-Turkey High-Level Dialogue on Trade |
| 2026 | Germany and Turkey agree to expand cooperation on energy and raw materials (Turkish-German Energy and Minerals Partnership) |
| 2026 | Third EU-Turkey High-Level Dialogue on Trade (13 October 2026) |
| Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, “Zur Geschichte der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen 1918 bis 1998”, (Wissenschaftliche Dienste), European Commission, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. | |
After the end of the Second World War and especially following the resumption of diplomatic relations in the early 1950s, bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey rapidly intensified. As a Cold War flank state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey – a member of the alliance since 1952 – contributed to (West) Germany’s security umbrella, while the Federal Republic assisted with the modernisation of Turkey’s armed forces and Ankara’s bid to join what was then the European Economic Community. Through NATO membership, Germany and Turkey are allies that cooperate closely on military, security, and intelligence initiatives – for example, the European Sky Shield.
Relations are not limited to the security realm, however. The bilateral labour recruitment agreement between Ankara and Bonn (1961) helped West Germany meet its labour needs during the post-war economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder); at the same time, it provided Turkey with some relief regarding unemployment levels and helped the country meet its foreign exchange needs through the remittances of so-called guest workers (Gastarbeiter). The guest worker community gave rise to a transnational diaspora that has become a political factor for Germany and established a strong bridge between Germany and Turkey.
The relationship between Germany and Turkey is embedded in a number of international institutions and organisations. Both countries are members of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, and the Council of Europe.
What is more important in economic and political terms is that Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership and part of the EU’s single market through the Customs Union (CU). Germany played a pivotal role in Turkey’s accession to the CU (in 1995) by helping elevate its status to that of EU candidate state (1999) and initiate the accession negotiations between Brussels and Ankara (2005).
Over the past decades, German and Turkish companies have engaged in extensive business exchanges, which are reflected in the steady expansion of bilateral trade, investment relations, and transnational people-to-people interactions. Numerous large German companies (such as Siemens, AEG, Mercedes Benz, Hugo Boss, TUI, and SunExpress) have had long-standing corporate representation and facilities in Turkey, while Turkish companies (including Egetürk, Turkish Airlines, Gazi, and numerous family-operated retail shops and restaurants) have made a lasting impact on the German economy.
German and Turkish companies have also established a number of institutional formats for bilateral cooperation in recent years. These platforms are designed to expand the scope of bilateral trade and investment relations. To illustrate: the German-Turkish Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) was established in 2013 as a cross-industry platform. Its objective is to reinforce bilateral collaboration, particularly in the domains of trade, industrial cooperation, tourism, and infrastructure. Annual meetings are held as part of this cooperation format up to 2026.
The German-Turkish Energy Forum, established in 2012, is another project collaboration. The forum serves as a central platform for energy policy dialogue between the governments and businesses of the two countries. Its focus is on renewable energies, energy efficiency, electricity distribution, and transmission grids. Germany is providing financial assistance to Turkey in the form of loans, which are part of the investment subsidies from the International Climate Initiative (IKI). These credit lines are being implemented by the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) in cooperation with the Turkish Central Bank (TC Merkez Bankası).
Based on IMF projections for 2026, Germany is the world’s third-largest economy in terms of GDP, while Turkey ranks 16th. In recent years Turkey has recorded relatively strong GDP growth, particularly compared with Germany (see Fig. 1).
Germany has a comparatively high savings rate. According to Eurostat, the gross household savings rate in Germany was 18.9 percent in 2025, compared with 14.3 percent in Turkey, based on data from TURKSTAT. Because of insufficient savings, Turkey is forced to resort to external financial resources in order to make essential investments (Euro News, 2023).
Despite Germany’s efforts to reinforce its digital sovereignty in its bid to become a formidable digital powerhouse, it continues to act as a technology provider for Turkey (KfW Research, 2021; Campanile, 2024).
Fig. 1: Real GDP Growth
Although Germany has recorded a lower growth rate in recent decades (see Fig. 1), its GDP is more than three times that of Turkey, as is its GDP per capita (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2: GDP per Capita
The total land area of Turkey is more than twice that of Germany. Moreover, it has a slightly larger population than Germany – approximately 86 million, compared with Germany's 83.5 million as of the end of 2025. This provides German companies with a large domestic export market and manufacturing opportunities.
The population projections in Fig. 3 are based on World Bank data (Population Estimates and Projections database). In terms of population size, Turkey overtook Germany around 2016. This reflects the contrasting demographic trajectories of the two countries, with Turkey's population projected to grow and Germany's to decline through 2050.
Fig. 3: Population Projections for Turkey, Germany, and EU 27
There are a number of Turkish demographic factors that are critical for German companies faced with making investment decisions. According to current projections, the Turkish population is expected to be the largest among EU Member States and Europe's second largest by 2050, after Russia and ahead of Germany. Turkey's working-age population is projected to continue growing in absolute terms for some years, even as its share of the total population gradually declines.
Fig. 4: Population Projections for Turkey by Age Group
Furthermore, Turkey has a young population compared with that of European countries. In 2025, those aged 14 and under accounted for approximately 21 per cent of the total population (see Fig. 4), compared with 14.4 per cent in the EU (27) (see Fig. 5). Turkey´s working-age population (aged 15 to 64) accounted for 68.4 per cent of the total population, compared with 63.7 per cent in the EU 27, while the share of its population aged 65 and over is considerably lower. This more favourable demographic structure provides Turkey with a relatively larger potential labour force and reduces the immediate pressure on public pension and age-related social expenditure.
Despite its comparatively young population, Turkey had the lowest labour-force participation rate of all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2025: 60.2 per cent of the working-age population (aged 15 to 64), compared with 80.5 per cent in Germany. While the Turkish figure was up from 59.6 per cent in 2023, it was still well below both the OECD average and the Germany labour-force participation rate.
Fig. 5: Population Projections for the EU 27 by Age Group
Fig. 6: Population projections for Germany by Age Group
Owing to its geographical location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, Turkey serves as a transit corridor for oil and gas, a hub for land-based and maritime transport routes, and a springboard to emerging markets. Apart from demography and market size, there are several structural factors that explain the attractiveness of Turkey for German companies.
First, the main product lines of the Turkish export economy are characterised by medium-value added manufactured goods such as automobiles, machinery, textiles, and clothing (leather). Second, Turkey is a supplier of services and its economy depends heavily on tourism and the financial sector (banking and insurance). Third, the EU is Turkey’s largest export market. Over the past two decades, the regional composition of Turkey’s foreign trade has shifted significantly: the EU’s share of Turkey’s total trade declined from 46 per cent in 2002 to 36 per cent in 2025, while the share of the BRICS countries increased from 9 per cent to 18 per cent over the same period (see Fig. 7).
Fig. 7: Shares of the EU 27, BRICS, and Germany in Turkey´s Total Trade
Within the EU, Germany remains Turkey’s most important trading partner, accounting for approximately one-fifth of EU-Turkey trade (see Fig. 8).
Fig. 8: Germany´s Share of EU 27 Trade with Turkey
Since 2017, Turkey’s total trade in goods with the EU has become much more balanced: as Fig. 9 shows, the value of imports and exports has been almost equal in recent years. The EU-Turkey CU is an important driver of bilateral trade in goods. In 2025, Turkey's goods trade with the EU 27 totalled US$ 232.5 billion, accounting for approximately 36 per cent of Turkey's overall goods trade of US$ 638.6 billion. The EU is Turkey’s single-largest trade partner in goods: in 2025, approximately 43 per cent of Turkish exports went to the EU, while around 35 per cent of Turkish imports originated from the EU.
Fig. 9: Turkey’s Total Trade in Goods with the EU 27
As a result of the growth of the Turkish economy in recent decades, regional differences between the east and west of the country as well as between the north and south have narrowed in terms of the economy, social standards, and infrastructure. All the major cities in the western and southern parts of Turkey are expected to grow in terms of population size in the coming years. In prosperous industrial centres – such as Bursa, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, and Antalya – further industrialisation and continued economic growth are expected. Therefore, these centres will experience strong population growth owing to new waves of internal migration, especially from the surrounding hinterlands and as a result of refugee arrivals or relocations.
Germany belongs to the group of countries with the highest share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey. As Fig. 10 shows, annual net FDI flows from Germany to Turkey reached US$2.6 billion in 2023 before declining to just under US$1.6 billion in 2024. Between 2013 and 2024, cumulative net German FDI flows to Turkey amounted to US$18.7 billion. In comparison, net FDI flows from Turkey to Germany remained low, fluctuating considerably over the same period and even turning negative in 2023 and 2024.
Infrastructure modernisation, market size, and demographics are key factors in Turkey’s attractiveness for German companies. At the same time, the large Turkish community in Germany is an incentive for Turkish companies to invest in Germany.
Fig. 10: Net FDI Flows Between Germany and Turkey
As Fig. 11 illustrates, annual net FDI flows from the EU 27 to Turkey have remained volatile in recent years: having totalled some US$10.8 billion in 2022 and again in 2023, they fell to US$6.5 billion in 2024. Meanwhile, net FDI flows from Turkey to the EU 27 were consistently much lower, totalling US$1.9 billion in 2024. Cumulative net FDI flows from the EU 27 to Turkey for the period 2013–2024 were US$67.2 billion.
Fig. 11: Net FDI Flows Between EU 27 and Turkey
Turkey has competitive export sectors that are part of international value and supply chains. They include the automotive sector, which is at the forefront of Turkish exporting and technological innovation. Germany remained the largest export destination for Turkish car manufacturers in 2025, with exports worth US$6.6 billion, accounting for 15.9 per cent of the sector's total exports of US$41.5 billion (up from US$35 billion in 2023).
The electric motor vehicle TOGG – the first of its kind in Turkey – is now in serial production. The country is also a large market for vehicles “Made in Germany”. With numerous highly modern and effective research and innovation clusters, the Turkish automotive industry is preparing itself for the challenges of the digital transition (Aydın, 2024). BYD’s decision to abandon its planned investment in production facilities in Turkey is linked in part to delays in modernising the EU-Turkey CU and is a setback for the Turkish automotive industry. (Aydın, 2020). It underscores the urgent need to modernise and expand the CU to address issues such as supply-chain transparency and the revised subsidy rules governing the production of Chinese electric vehicles in Europe (Bastian, 2024).
Engagement between financial sector firms from Germany and Turkey has been rather limited. Deutsche Bank operates in Turkey through its subsidiary Deutsche Bank A.Ş., established in 1987, while Landesbank Baden-Württemberg has maintained a representative office in Istanbul since 2015. Commerzbank has a representative office in Istanbul, too. Aside from that, the promotional bank KfW IPEX-Bank is registered in Istanbul. By contrast, all leading Turkish banks (KT Bank, Ziraat Bank, TF Bank, and İşbank) have representative offices and/or branches across Germany, catering to the Turkish community and businesses. Even as international investors are gradually regaining confidence in the Turkish financial sector, German banks are not yet prepared to join them.
Turkey has been investing in the energy sector for years now – several billion euros have been allocated for the expansion of energy infrastructure and technical equipment required for gas exploration. As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, Turkey has set itself the goal of achieving a climate-neutral economy by 2053. Accordingly, investments are being made in renewable energies to transition to a carbon-free economy.
All this, together with a favourable climate, makes Turkey an attractive market and investment country for international energy companies. The beneficiaries are not only domestic companies that build large-scale machinery but also major international corporations that manufacture high-tech equipment and machinery. Thanks to domestic climatic conditions, Turkey has a high potential for natural energy sources such as solar, hydrogen, geothermal, and wind energy.
The 2026 COP31 climate conference is being hosted by Turkey. Priority discussion topics include accelerating the energy transition through the expansion of renewable energy sources, providing climate finance to the countries and regions that need it most, strengthening resilience to the impacts of climate change, and protecting ecosystems, water resources, and food systems.
Fig. 12: German and Other Foreign Visitors to Turkey
It is evident from Fig. 12 that tourism plays a significant role in the Turkish economy. Between 2022 and 2025, the number of German tourists visiting Turkey rose from 5.7 million to a record 6.7 million, accounting for 12.8 per cent of all foreign visitors. It follows that German tourists are a major contributor to Turkey’s foreign-currency revenue.
Turkey's textile sector remains important both for employment and export earnings. However, in recent years, it has come under pressure: registered employment in the sector declined from approximately 1 million workers in 2023 to 846,000 in 2025. Turkey has nevertheless remained a major global textile exporter, ranking sixth worldwide in 2025, with a global market share of 3.5 per cent.
The Turkish textile industry has succeeded in maintaining and improving its position on the international market thanks to its strong internal dynamics, namely, its manufacturing capacity and export orientation. Exports from Turkey’s clothing industry totalled US$17.14 billion in 2020 but declined somewhat to US$16.8 billion in 2025.
Another important industry is the construction sector, which is a major driver of transport infrastructure and residential construction. However, the earthquake in February 2023, which had an devastating impact on southeastern Turkey, tragically illustrated major deficits and corrupt practices in the construction sector.
Despite its competitive export sectors, the Turkish economy continues to face challenges posed by high inflation, the low domestic savings rate, dependence on external financing, and limited institutional independence from the executive. While measures taken by Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek from summer 2023 onwards are aimed at restoring investor confidence in the Turkish economy, new developments such as the stock market scandal in September 2026 have raised concerns about the Turkish financial market, especially as regards transparency, regulatory oversight, and political interference.
The Turkish defence industry has developed rapidly over the past decade. Its products – most prominently, drones – have frequently demonstrated their military capabilities in various theatres of conflict, including Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish military-industrial complex is an increasingly important economic factor and has significantly expanded its export capacity over the past 10 years or so.
In 2025, Turkey’s defence and aerospace exports reached a record high: official figures put the value of goods and services exported at US$10.1 billion, with goods accounting for US$9.87 billion and services US$184 million. Europe accounted for approximately US$4.3 billion of Turkey’s defence goods exports and the EU, NATO countries, and the US combined for US$5.6 billion or 56 per cent. The US, the United Kingdom, and Slovakia were the three largest export destinations.
This upward trend continued in 2026: in July, monthly exports of defence and aerospace goods and services reached US$1.12 billion, an increase of 14.4 per cent compared with July 2025. Between January and July, exports rose by 26.2 per cent year on year to US$5.79 billion, while exports over the preceding 12 months totalled US$11.2 billion. Turkey’s growing international industrial presence is reflected in the inclusion in 2022 of four Turkish companies – Baykar, Aselsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), and Roketsan –in SIPRI’s list of the world’s 100 largest arms-producing companies.
At the same time, there are signs of closer integration with European defence production. Beginning in 2027, the Turkish company Repkon is expected to produce 155 mm artillery ammunition in Germany. Turkish policymakers and defence companies are seeking access to the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financing mechanism, which provides up to €150 billion in loans to support European defence procurement and industrial cooperation.
Taken together, these developments point to the continued expansion of Turkey’s defence-industrial capacity and its growing integration into European and other international defence markets.
In recent decades, the volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and Germany has increased and diversified. After reaching a record US$49.8 billion in 2023, trade declined somewhat in 2024 before rising to a new high of US$52.3 billion in 2025. The same year, Turkish exports to Germany totalled US$22.2 billion, representing an increase of approximately 9 per cent compared with the previous year (2024). The volume of Turkish imports from Germany totalled US$30,1 billion in 2025 – an 11 per cent increase. Although there have been significant events affecting bilateral trade, such as the Turkish economic crisis in 2001, the global financial crisis in 2009, and the widespread disruption due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, its long-term trajectory has been one of growth, with trade recovering from each successive downturn.
As of 2025, Germany accounts for 8.1 per cent of Turkey’s total exports (Fig. 13a) and is the country’s largest export partner. The United Kingdom and the US follow in second and third place, with 6.1 per cent and 6.0 per cent, respectively. As regards Turkey’s total imports, China has the highest share with 13.6 per cent, followed by Russia with 11.6 per cent. Germany accounts for 8.2 per cent of Turkey´s total imports. Turkey’s share in Germany’s imports and exports is just 1.9 per cent (Figure 13b).
Fig. 13a: Shares of Main Partners in Turkey’s Imports and Exports, 2025
Fig 13b: Shares of Main Partners in Germany’s Imports and Exports, 2025
Fig. 13c: Shares of Main Partners in EU 27’s Imports and Exports, 2025
EU trade with Turkey has the potential to expand further if the ongoing negotiations about the modernisation of the CU bear fruit. This expansion would include sectors such as services (finance and insurance) and unprocessed agricultural products. The CU has brought significant growth and welfare gains to Turkey and other countries in the union. There are also geopolitical implications to consider: a modernised CU would further strengthen both EU-Turkey and Germany-Turkey (economic and political) relations. In the absence of such modernisation, countries such as Russia (via Rosatom) and China (via BYD) are enlarging their footprints in Turkey.
Besides the outdated CU, there are two other issues that present potential challenges for EU-Turkey and Germany–Turkey trade relations.
First, the EU’s evolving industrial policy could make market access more difficult for Turkish companies. Alongside existing instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and trade defence measures in the steel sector, the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act would establish a closer link between public procurement and support schemes in selected industries, on the one hand, and European value creation and low-emissions production, on the other. For Turkey, the key question is whether its close integration into European value chains will be adequately recognised. Although the CU facilitates the movement of goods, it does not guarantee Turkish companies’ equal access to public procurement and all EU funding instruments. Similarly, EU companies do not enjoy guaranteed equal access to Turkey’s public procurement.
Second, the planned EU-India free trade agreement could increase competitive pressure on Turkish exporters in the EU market. As a result of trade barriers being lowered, Indian suppliers could be given a competitive advantage over Turkish export firms if the former gain preferential market access not available to the latter. The export profiles of India and Turkey overlap in several key sectors. Turkey’s main exports to the EU – and to Germany as well – include vehicles and vehicle parts, machinery, textiles, and iron and steel products. For its part, India exports machinery and technical equipment, chemicals, textiles, and mineral products, among other goods, to Turkey. These overlaps could lead to increased competition, particularly in sectors where Indian producers enjoy additional price advantages owing to tariff reductions (Aydin, 2026).
Fig. 14: Turkey’s Main Exports to and Imports from Germany
As Fig. 14 illustrates, the single largest category of Turkish goods imports from Germany in terms of value in 2025 was means of transport (vehicles and automotive parts) (US$8.95 billion or 29.7 per cent), closely followed by machinery, electrical components, and mechanical appliances (US$8.75 billion or 29.1 per cent). Together, these two categories accounted for nearly 59 per cent of Turkey's total goods imports from Germany.
Turkey’s main exports to Germany include means of transport (vehicles and automotive parts), machinery and electrical components, and textiles (apparel and clothing), but increasingly base metals as well. Fig. 14 highlights the similarities between the sectoral composition of Turkey’s imports and exports to Germany; the main difference is the lower volumes of exports compared with imports. The single largest category of Turkish goods exports to Germany in terms of value in 2025 was means of transport (US$5.02 billion or 22.6 per cent), closely followed by machinery, electrical components, and mechanical appliances (US$4.88 billion or 22.0 per cent). Together, these two categories accounted for approximately 45 per cent of Turkey's total goods exports to Germany.
Turkey is an important exporter of services, particularly in the tourism and transport sectors. In its services trade with the EU, transport plays a particularly prominent role, with exports worth €14.2 billion in 2024, followed by business services, telecommunications, computer and information services, as well as insurance and pension services (see Fig. 15).
Fig. 15: Turkey's Main Services Exports to and Imports from the EU 27
How can Turkey-Germany economic relations and cooperation develop further in the coming years? A key factor will be Turkey’s medium-term economic stability, as will Turkey’s and Germany’s green energy transformations. Turkey’s efforts to align its industrial production with European climate objectives create new opportunities for closer cooperation with Germany in renewable energy, industrial transformation, critical minerals, and resilient supply chains. Against this backdrop, the German-Turkish Energy Forum provides an important framework for deepening energy cooperation and strengthening the strategic partnership between Berlin and Ankara.
Both Turkey and Germany are in favour of opening new channels of commercial exchange and foreign investments. Towards that end, bilateral cooperation will require political frameworks in both countries that are reliable and can overcome current transactionalism. In other words, the rule of law should be re-established in Turkey and trust-building mechanisms expanded with Germany. Increasing institutional cooperation in the areas of energy and the “green transition” can lay the foundation for this to happen.
A significant opportunity for economic cooperation is offered by transnational linkages, which are reflected in Germany’s sizeable Turkish community of some 3.1 million people, as well as the extensive personal, family and professional connections linking the two countries. In 2025, around 1.52 million residents held Turkish citizenship without German citizenship. In addition, approximately 1.28 million people with a Turkish immigration history held German citizenship, either exclusively or alongside another nationality, having acquired it at birth or through naturalisation.
Since the mid-2010s, there has been a new wave of Turkish migrants who are both highly skilled and well educated and contribute to the health and IT sectors in Germany. This trend is particularly evident in the health sector, where the number of physicians with Turkish citizenship working in Germany has risen from approximately 1,000 in 2015 to more than 3,100 in 2024 and more than 3,500 in 2025.
Thus, there is a substantial pool of labour for German and Turkish companies in each country to tap into. Further opportunities are opening up in the area of training and recruiting, especially among medical and nursing professionals. Given the need for skilled workers in Germany, these are important factors that must be taken into account in the event of a revision of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 (the so-called Refugee Deal) (Aydin, 2024).
Fig. 16: Unemployment and Employment Rates of Turkish Citizens in Germany
The unemployment rate of Turkish nationals in Germany is higher than that of German nationals. This is not just a curse but also a blessing. It points to untapped potential in terms of labour market integration and the filling of skills gaps.
Fig. 16, which is based on data from 2023, illustrates the regional differences in employment and unemployment rates among Turkish citizens in Germany: the broad north-south and east-west disparities in the German labour market resemble those observed among German citizens. More recent figures from the German Federal Employment Agency indicate that there is a persistent significant disparity in labour market outcomes among Turkish and German nationals: in March 2026, the unemployment rate among Turkish citizens stood at 15.6 per cent, compared with 6.0 per cent among German citizens. Similarly, the employment rate was considerably lower among Turkish nationals – 56.0 per cent, compared with 70.1 per cent among German citizens.
Finally, Turkish-German business associations engage in bilateral trade and economic cooperation. While, according to current estimates suggested that there were around 75,000 entrepreneurs with roots in Turkey employing approximately 375,000 people and generating a combined annual turnover of €35 billion, more recent figures published by ATİAD (in 2026) put the number of Turkish-origin businesses in Germany at approximately 100,000, with an estimated combined annual turnover of €75 billion.