Map of military operations in the Transcaucasian region from 1809 to 1817, 1817.

Turkey's Policy in the South Caucasus

One effect of the Soviet Union's implosion was the re-emergence of three independent South Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This immediately affected the foreign policy postures of neighbouring Turkey and Russia (not to mention Iran), the EU and its member states, and the United States.

Since the turn of the millennium, Turkey has sought to increase its regional footprint by taking bilateral steps, with varying degrees of success; proposing and promoting regional initiatives, including the “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” in January 2000, the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” in August 2008, and the “3+3” format in December 2020; and, most recently, signalling interest in participating directly in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. 

For the EU, Turkey is still a formal candidate for accession, albeit a dormant one. It is also a major economic, trade, connectivity, security, and migration policy partner. Although Ankara’s strategic role in the South Caucasus and elsewhere is acknowledged by the EU and appreciated by some of its member states, Turkey is increasingly being viewed as a challenge – a competitor and even a rival – in the context of the EU’s drive to become a stronger geopolitical actor. 

Against this background, this project aims to assess how Turkey’s engagement in the South Caucasus is perceived in some EU member states and other major power centres, to identify areas of cooperation and divergence, and to evaluate the implications of the foregoing for the EU.

Publications

Ragıp Soylu

Turkey in the South Caucasus: Implications for the EU

Ankara sees cooperation with the European Union as crucial for stabilising the South Caucasus, developing infrastructure for the Middle Corridor, and resolving frozen conflicts. However, Turkey prefers to keep its distance rather than fully engaging with Brussels, given the EU’s perception of Ankara as a rival rather than a partner. This mindset excludes Turkey from EU policy discussions, preventing it from contributing its own assessments and priorities, and further deepens distrust and antagonism.

CATS Network Paper, No. 25, 18 July 2025, 42 Pages

more
Aurélien Denizeau

France’s Assessment of Turkey’s Policy in the South Caucasus

Implications for the EU

French policy in the South Caucasus is driven more by distinct bilateral relationships – with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – than by any coherent regional vision. Due to its special ties with Armenia and its tensions with Azerbaijan, France’s approach to these two countries is bilateral and not part of a common EU diplomacy. Its relations with Georgia are closer to those of its EU partners. While France observes Turkey’s growing role in the region with concern, their relationship here is less conflictual than in other areas, such as the Eastern Mediterranean

CATS Network Paper, No. 24, 18 July 2025, 37 Pages

more
Péter Pál Kránitz

Hungary’s Assessment of Türkiye’s Policy in the South Caucasus

Implications for the EU

Hungary is Türkiye’s closest EU partner, sharing an Enhanced Strategic Partnership in energy, trade, defence, and more. Both align on key issues like migration, NATO expansion, and connectivity. Hungary supports Türkiye’s role in the South Caucasus, cooperating with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on stability and infrastructure. Their joint backing of Georgia’s government reflects shared concerns over regional instability. Together, they promote energy and transport links connecting Europe to the Caspian region. Hungary’s partnership with Türkiye highlights the EU’s need for pragmatic engagement with Ankara, shifting from ideological to realistic, respectful diplomacy.

CATS Network Paper, No. 23, 14 July 2025, 32 Pages

more
Svante E. Cornell

America’s Assessment of Turkey’s Policy in the South Caucasus

Implications for the EU

The United States lacks a clear strategy toward either Turkey or the South Caucasus, but recent developments could lead Washington to see the benefits of coordination with Ankara in this part of the world.

CATS Network Paper, No. 13, 26 March 2025, 23 Pages

more

Germany’s Perceptions of Turkey’s Policy in the South Caucasus

From Coexistence to Cooperation?

Turkey is a NATO ally, an EU membership candidate and a confident geopolitical actor. The latter aspect is uppermost in Berlin’s assessment of Ankara’s policy in the South Caucasus, where Turkey’s growing influence is recognised. If they are to make the most of the potential for cooperation, Ankara and Berlin each need to acknowledge the other’s foreign policy framework and find ways to reconcile Turkey’s autonomous line with Germany’s EU-oriented and often normative approach.

CATS Network Paper, No. 12, 17 February 2025, 30 Pages

more
Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Russia’s Assessment of Turkey’s Policy in the South Caucasus

Implications for the EU

The decline of Russian influence in the South Caucasus means that Moscow must incentivise Turkey to limit the access and reach of Western powers in the region. The Kremlin must ensure Ankara’s interests are better served in protecting Russia’s vital equities rather than undermining them.

CATS Network Paper, No. 11, 18 December 2024, 33 Pages

more