
Turkish President Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani at the signing of the four-nation memorandum on the Development Road project in Baghdad, 22 April 2024.
© picture alliance / REUTERS | Thaier Al-Sudani
The conflict over the Strait of Hormuz is altering trade and energy routes between Europe and Asia. Turkey is positioning itself as a key transit hub between East and West – a move that presents opportunities but also entails some risks, says Hürcan Aslı Aksoy.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy
The US-Israel war against Iran and the standoff in the Strait of Hormuz are reshaping trade and transport links as well as changing regional connectivity across Eurasia. Disruptions to shipping and energy flows in the Strait, through which a fifth of global oil and gas trade passes in peacetime, are prompting regional actors to seek alternatives and creating openings for new transport corridors. Turkey is moving quickly to capitalise on this shift. Ankara is presenting itself as a relatively secure hub for trade, transport, and energy, turning connectivity into an instrument of strategic autonomy and regional influence.
As maritime routes become more vulnerable and fragmentation in the Middle East deepens, Turkey is increasingly focusing on three areas: energy corridors, air connectivity, and the South Caucasus.
Long central to Ankara’s ambitions, energy transit has gained renewed urgency amid recent instability in the Gulf. The Southern Gas Corridor, stretching from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to southern Europe, has become one of the few overland routes delivering non-Russian gas to the European Union. Its strategic importance has increased as alternative supply routes have become more vulnerable to disruption.
Ankara is also placing growing emphasis on Iraq’s Development Road Project (DRP), which aims to connect energy resources from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to Europe via Iraq and Turkey. As risks to maritime shipping rise, the DRP becomes more attractive, allowing Turkey to position itself as a relatively stable and potentially indispensable trade route.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline further strengthens Turkey’s position. In 2025, the pipeline transported around 207 million barrels to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and has remained one of the few export outlets not directly exposed to Gulf-related disruptions. Energy flows through Turkish territory thus enhance Ankara’s leverage.
Turkey is also consolidating its position as an aviation hub connecting Europe and Asia. With northern routes over Russia and parts of Middle Eastern airspace restricted, Turkish Airlines has expanded its network. Istanbul Airport, Europe’s busiest air hub in 2024, has emerged as a key transit point linking Europe to Central and East Asia.
This air connectivity reinforces Turkey’s role in global mobility networks and strengthens its ties with emerging markets across Asia. The recent resumption of flights between Istanbul and Tehran, following the partial opening of airspace, revives commercial activity. It also signals a pragmatic diplomatic engagement between Ankara and Tehran despite broader regional tensions.
The South Caucasus is becoming a critical pillar of Turkey’s connectivity strategy. Following the realignments after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, new opportunities have emerged for transport corridors linking Turkey to the Caspian and beyond.
Direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul restarted after six years of suspension, reconnecting Armenia to Western routes. In addition, Ankara is deepening cooperation with Azerbaijan to develop corridors that bypass both Russia and Iran, integrating the region more firmly into east-west trade networks.
These efforts are closely tied to the so-called Middle Corridor, which connects energy and transport routes from China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea while offering a viable alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia. If successfully expanded, it could significantly enhance Turkey’s role as a transit country in Eurasian trade while shortening transit times and reducing risks for European supply chains.
Taken together, these initiatives reflect Turkey’s efforts to formalise its ties with regional partners through connectivity. In a context of conflict and fragmentation, Ankara is accelerating this approach, embedding itself deeply in regional networks through infrastructure, energy cooperation, and long-term economic frameworks. For Europe, this has tangible implications: The viability of alternative corridors will shape energy prices, supply-chain resilience, and trade routes in the years ahead.
Yet, Turkey’s strategy carries risks. Many of these corridors run through fragile political environments, from Iraq to the South Caucasus. Instability could just as easily derail Turkey’s ambitions as advance them, leaving European partners exposed to the very disruptions Ankara’s strategy is meant to mitigate.